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Introduction

A. HistoricalBackgroundand Setting: unto 2002
After the British Empire established sovereignty over Australia in
the nineteenth century, the Crown distributed land to settlers and private
interests without any consideration of the rights and interests in the land
belonging to the indigenous inhabitants. Thus the doctrine of terra nullius
("no one's land") became the legal grounds by which British authorities
settled Australia. Indigenous inhabitants whose lands were encroached upon
were afforded neither compensation nor recognition. That the Crown did not
recognize the rights and interests of indigenous inhabitants and failed to
declare any such interests extinguished upon conquest, however, would
become an avenue to justice under the Australian common law in the late
twentieth century.
Two hundred and four years after Captain Cook arrived in Botany
Bay, the High Court of Australia recognized the continuing existence of
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indigenous rights and interests in land where British or Australian
sovereignty did not manifest a clear and plain intent to extinguish such rights
and interests.' On June 3, 1992, the High Court of Australia announced a
stunning decision in Mabo v Queensland J1,2 recognizing that indigenous
Australians, to the extent that the ancient rights of their pre-colonial
ancestors in land had been preserved and not extinguished, had retained
"native title" in relation to that land.3 Wherever the Crown had not yet
alienated land, thereby making the Australian sovereign the sole holder of
legal rights through its radical title, the descendants of the indigenous4
inhabitants of that land would have a claim to coexisting rights and interests.
Native title, as Brennan J's majority opinion articulated, thus exists as a
"burden" upon the Crown's radical title.5 Furthermore, any indigenous
community claiming native title to unalienated Crown land must have
"substantially maintained . . . a traditional connexion" to their ancestral
lands.6
With rapid legislative response, Parliament gave its approval to the
common law's recognition of "native title" by enacting the Native Title Act
of 1993 (NTA).7 In line with modem perspectives on human rights and
international justice, the NTA proclaims that the foremost aim of the
Commonwealth of Australia is "to provide for the recognition and protection
of native title.",8 Basing its language on Brennan J's majority decision in
Mabo, Parliament entrenched the definition of native title in § 223(1) of the
NTA:
(1) The expression native title or native title rights and interests means
the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:

See generally Mabo v. Queensland H (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 57-65 (requiring a clear and plain
intent to extinguish a property right under the common law through legislative or executive act by the
sovereign).
2
Id. Mabo involved the land ownership of the Murray Islands, as alleged by the Meriam
Peoples. Id. at 4-5. The majority held that "the common law of this country recognizes a form of native
title which, in the cases where it has not been extinguished, reflects the entitlement of the indigenous
inhabitants, in accordance with their laws or customs, to their traditional lands." Id. at 15. The Court
granted native title to the Meriam Peoples. Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 57.
5
Id. at 58.
6

8

Id. at 59-60.

Native Title Act, 1993.
Id. at § 3(a).
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(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; 9 and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and
customs, have a connection with the land or waters;' 0 and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of
Australia.

Though the NTA reflects an attempt to organize comprehensively
the procedures and consequences of native title law, the Parliament that
enacted the NTA could not have foreseen the excruciating complexity of
defining native title through the judicial system."
Several High Court
decisions have elucidated further attributes of native title that were not yet
recognized in 1993.12 In truth, native title today still remains an infant within
the common law of property, 3 and the common law of Australia continues to
extend its recognition of4native title's nature and characteristics only as the
case law might demand.'
Though an era of optimism followed the High Court decisions in
Mabo and Wik, the honeymoon ended abruptly in 2002, when the High Court
decided three native title cases that impose onerous obstacles on indigenous
peoples' native title claims over land.' 5 This Note examines the
consequences of the High Court of Australia's final of those three
decisions,
16
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria.

9
Cf Mabo v. Queensland 1H(1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 57 ("The term 'native title' conveniently
describes the interests and rights of indigenous inhabitants in land, whether communal, group or
individual, possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by
the indigenous inhabitants.").
10
Cf id. at 70 ("Native title to particular land ... its incidents and the persons entitled thereto are
ascertained according to the laws and customs of the indigenous people who, by those laws and customs,
have a connection with the land.").
I
NTA § 223(l).
12
See, e.g., Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1 (holding that native title could also
exist partially, in concurrence with certain leaseholds that failed to amount to alienated Crown land). The
holding in Wik significantly influenced Parliament's act to amend the NTA, the Native Title Amendment
Act of 1998.
13 The rights and interests that constitute native title, however, are far more ancient in practice.
14
See NTA § 223(1)(c) (deferring to the common law in the recognition of what constitutes
native title).
is
W. Austl. v. Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1; Wilson v. Anderson (2002) 213 C.L.R. 401; Members
of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422.
16
Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 422. In 1994, the Yorta Yorta indigenous community filed for
native title to public land and water in Northern Victoria and Southern New South Wales. Id. at 423.
Title was denied at the lower court, and appeals were subsequently dismissed. Id.
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B. The High Court of Australia in Yorta Yorta
In Yorta Yorta, the High Court's Joint Judgment majority elaborated
further upon Brennan J's requirement in Mabo and its own interpretation of
NTA § 223(1), that native title claimants prove a "traditional connection" to
land. The trial judge 17 who presided over Yorta Yorta had relied almost
exclusively upon Mabo's common law test to decide whether the indigenous
claimants had "substantially maintained" their traditional connection or
whether their traditions had been "washed away by the tide of history."' 8
Indicating that the trial judge "may [have given] undue emphasis ...to what
was said in Mabo [No 2]' 19 when interpreting NTA § 223(1), the High Court
clarified that the present definition of native title originates, not from Mabo
or any other common law decision, but principally from NTA § 223(1).20
According to the majority, the requirement that native title claimants
demonstrate a "traditional connection" should not be analyzed solely through
Brennan's guidelines in Mabo, but rather it is the language of NTA §
223(1)(b) that should define the initial search for "a connection by
[traditional] laws and customs." The statutory definition of "native title
rights and interests",2 1 itself requires that the contemporary laws and customs
of the applicant indigenous people must be the same as the "traditional laws
and customs" that existed before the arrival of British or Australian
sovereignty.22 No interruption to the practice of traditional law and customs
may have occurred,23 and the traditional legal system of the indigenous
people, though the High Court insisted that it could "adapt" traditional laws
and customs in response to the British Colonization, may not have ever

17 Typically termed the "primary judge" in the jargon of Federal Court of Australia, use of the
term "trial judge" is intended to avoid confusing an American audience. "His Honour," however, is still
His Honour.
Is Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. The State of Victoria & Ors (1998) F.C.A.
1606, 1 3 & 126 (citing Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 60).
19 Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 451, 70.
Id. at 453, 1 75 (Gleeson, C.J., Gummow & Hayne, JJ.).
20
21

NTA § 223(l).

22

Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 455,

83. But cf Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 60 ("A native title which

has ceased with the abandoning of laws and customs based on tradition cannot be revived for
contemporary recognition. Australian law can protect the interests of members of an indigenous clan or
group, whether communally or individually, only in conformity with the traditional laws and customs of
the people to whom the clan or group belongs and only where members of the clan or group acknowledge
those laws and observe those customs (so far as it is practicable to do so).").
84-87.
23 Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 455-56,
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engaged in "parallel law-making" after the British declared sovereignty over
the indigenous people's land.24
Even though, as the dissent pointed out, NTA § 223(1) may be
interpreted just as plausibly without requiring any such demonstration of
historical continuity, 25 we are bound today to accept the controlling weight of
the majority's holding in Yorta Yorta. Within the scope of the majority's
holding, however, this Note endeavors to "redefine the boundaries of the
exclusive zone, 26 within which oral indigenous and anthropological evidence
of a traditional and customary connection to land ought to be weighed. Part I
of this Note examines how the new common law test from Yorta Yorta
suffers from a dearth of instruction in weighing evidence of modification of
or adaptation to traditional laws and customs. Broadly, the Court instructs
that the fundamental inquiry must answer: "[h]ow ... does the definition of
native title take account of whether there has been some modification of or
adaptation to traditional law and custom, or some interruption in the exercise
of native title rights and interests?" 27 Because the petition before the High
Court in Yorta Yorta only challenged the lower courts' finding and
affirmation that the traditional laws and customs of the Yorta Yorta
Aboriginal Community had been interrupted, the majority was in fact
obligated to implement only half of its theoretical analysis. Since Yorta
Yorta's fact pattern did not permit the High Court to fully explore its
theoretical postulates about the common law consequences of change to
uninterrupted traditional laws and customs, the High Court failed to provide
sufficient guidelines for analysis of the qualitative identity between the precolonial "traditional laws and customs" and the contemporary realization of
traditional laws and customs. Part I of this Note demonstrates that the
analytical test created in Mabo must necessarily be combined with the Yorta
Yorta test if native title claims are to "contain rules of evidence that contain
rational procedures of inquiry. ,,28 The defects of the latter need to be cured if
a reputation as "a process reasonably designed to
native title is to be restored
29
ascertain the truth.
Part II shows the foremost defect of this "traditional connection" test
in Yorta Yorta through two lower court decisions from 2006, Jango v
24
25
26

27
28

Id. at 443-44, n9 43-44.
Id. at 463, 1 111, and at 446, 123 (Gaudron & Kirby, JJ., dissenting).
White v. Jones House of Lords (1995) 2 A.C. 207, 257 (H.L.).
Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 454, 178.
Brian Murchison, Treating Physicians as Expert Witnesses in Compensation Systems: the

Public Health Connection, 90 Ky. L.J. 891, 897 (2002) (citing JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 238
(1971)).
29
Id. at 897 (citing JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 238 (1971)).
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Northern Territory of Australia30 and Griffiths v Northern Territory of
Australia.3 1 Because the High Court's majority in Yorta Yorta purposely
avoided meaningful discussion of how courts should weigh evidence of
modification of or adaptation to traditional laws and customs, 32 there has
been a severe divergence between Federal judges' interpretations of how
change to traditional laws and customs has impacted the traditional
connection required of an indigenous people to the claimed land. Even
though the NTA provides significant discretion to the Federal Courts in their
adherence to the rules of evidence,33 the disparate forms of evidence used in
native title claims, i.e., expert testimony, ethnographic history, and
indigenous oral evidence, are not yet well conceived in relation to one
another under the common law. Part I seeks to clarify the manner in which
these forms of evidence should be presented and perceived as a whole.
In both Jango and Griffiths, each judge found as a matter of fact that
a similar change to the traditional system of descent had occurred, from a
narrow system of patrilineal descent into a broader cognatic one.34
Regarding the legal implications of such change, however, these two Federal
judges came to diametrically opposed conclusions.35 The trial judge in
Jango, on the one hand, implemented Yorta Yorta's guidelines for analyzing
the "traditional connection," whereas the trial judge in Griffiths made use of
the guidelines from both Mabo and Yorta Yorta; these differences indicate
just how much the legal interpretation of what constitutes a "traditional
connection" may gravely affect the weighing of evidence.36 By critically
reviewing the manner in which the primary judges in Jango and Griffiths
weighed indigenous oral evidence and anthropological expert evidence of an
alleged change to the system of kinship and descent in accordance with their
divergent legal interpretations, our analysis seeks both to improve the
30
Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) 152 F.C.R. 150. In Jango, the applicants were of the
Yankunytjatjara and Pitjantjatjara peoples, who were seeking compensation from the Northern Territory
Government for native title rights. Id. at 15 1. Their interests had been extinguished by compensation acts
enacted from 1979 to 1994. Id. The Court, finding that the applicants did not meet their burden, denied

compensation. Id.
31
Griffiths v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) F.C.A. 903. Griffiths involved the determination of
native title of a town called Timber Creek. The court found the native peoples had non-exclusive native
title rights to use and enjoy the land and waters of the claim area.
32
See Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 455, 83 (stating that "[t]he relevant criterion to be applied in
deciding the significance of change to, or adaptation of, traditional law or custom is readily stated (though
its ap lication to particular facts may well be difficult")).
3
NTA § 82(l).
34
Jango, 152 F.C.R. at 288-89, 7 497-501; Griffiths, F.C.A. 903 at 501.

35

Id.

36

Id.
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common law's comprehension of anthropological expertise and ethnographic
history, and to illuminate how anthropological expertise and indigenous
witness testimony should be weighed holistically with reference to the fullest
available interpretation of the definition of native title.
Part III concludes this Note by addressing the ultimate conceptual
deficiency in the guidelines posited in Yorta Yorta: when the High Court
majority attempted to develop the term "normative system" as a universal
descriptor of all societies with a cognizable system of laws, it failed to
distinguish sufficiently between a Western "normative system" and an
indigenous Australian one. Intended to assist lower courts in implementing
the statutory definition of native title under NTA § 223(1), the "traditional
connection" test inquires whether native title claimants adhere to a
"normative system" of laws and customs which consists of the same
traditional laws and customs as their ancestors' "system. 3 7 The High
Court's attempt to define a universal conception of all legal systems in Yorta
Yorta is the ultimate source of undue prejudice in Jango against the native
title claimants. Despite the High Court's admonition that a "normative
system" need not "have all the characteristics of a developed European body
of written laws, 3 8 its parallel announcements, that "only those normative
rules [of ancient origin] are 'traditional' laws and customs," 39 and that
"[after] the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown ... there could []
be no parallel law-making system, 1,40 may easily mislead a trial judge in any
native title claim to scrutinize traditional laws and customs mistakenly in
light of general characteristics of European written laws. The "normative
rules" of indigenous Australian peoples must be better conceptualized within
the common law: no room can be left for the factfinder in native title claims
to continue in their misrecognition of traditional laws and customs through
inapt precepts of the Western legal tradition. Traditional laws and customs
of indigenous Australians are not to be treated in a common law court like a
codex of ancient practices. In order to avoid the confusion that "normative
rules" can create in native title claims, Part II urges that a better
understanding of indigenous Australian "normative systems" will seek to
find the "normative principles" that have been preserved through tradition
and permissible adaptation.

37

Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 441-45, 9H 39-48.

38

Id. at 441-42, 139.
Id. at 444, 146.
Id. at 443-44, 44.

39
40
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II. Part I: Answering the Unanswered Question of Yorta Yorta: What
constitutes Modification to TraditionalLaws and Customs Sufficient to
Extinguish Native Title?
Towards a Definition of Native Title: The Meaning of Mabo and NTA
§ 223(1) after Yorta Yorta

A.

On June 3, 1992, the High Court of Australia acknowledged in Mabo
v. Queensland I 41 that the ancient rights and interests in land and waters of
indigenous Australians survived the arrival of British sovereignty, and that
those ancient rights and interests have a continuing vitality in relation to the
common law, wherever those rights and interests have not been
extinguished.42 Brennan J, whose decision in Mabo would ultimately
provide the foundation for the Native Title Act's definition of "native title, '43
articulated that "native title" will have survived as much as 204 years of legal
suppression wherever:
1) traditional laws and customs of an identifiable indigenous
community had created rights and interests in land prior to the
declaration of British sovereignty; 44
2) the executive or legislative actions of an Australian sovereign, in
relation to Crown land "burdened" by native title rights or interests,
were not inconsistent with the continuing existence of native45 title and
therefore had not extinguished native title rights and interests;
3) those traditional laws and customs, originating from pre-colonial
indigenous societies, and giving rise to native title rights and interests,
have been "substantially maintained" in the intermediate period by the
identifiable community descending from the original indigenous
community between the declaration of sovereignty and the recognition
by the common law of those rights.46

(1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
Mabo v. Queensland 11
Id. at 15.
Native Title Act, 1993, TA § 223. Cf Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 57, 61 (defining native title as
"the interests and rights of indigenous inhabitants in land, whether communal, group or individual,
possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the
indigenous inhabitants").
44 Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 69 and 70, 1 83 (points 3 and 6).
45 Id. (points I and 4).
46
Id. (points 6 and 7).
41

42
43
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4) the native title rights and interests deriving from traditional laws and
customs must be recognizable under the common law before they may
be legally recognized. 4
In response to Mabo, the Australian Parliament acknowledged the
importance of protecting native title by enacting the Native Title Act of 1993
48
(NTA).
The NTA's provisions have established the procedures for
handling native title claims, 49 as well as codifying the complex substantive
rules that delineate under what circumstances just compensation shall be paid
for extinguished native title. 50 Most important for our purposes, the NTA has
also enshrined the principal elements of Brennan J's definition of native title
in § 223(1):
(1) The expression native title or native title rights and interests means
the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and
customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognized by the common law of
Australia. 51
Although the NTA articulated definitive procedures and guidelines
for the sake of native title law, difficult questions of law have nevertheless
found their way before the High Court. For example, questions have arisen
about the possibility that native title is not completely extinguished whenever
an act by a sovereign entity is only partially inconsistent with native title
47
Id. at 57. See also Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214
C.L.R. 422, 454, 77 ("[N]ative title rights and interests which are the subject of the [NTA] are those
which existed at sovereignty, survived that fundamental change in legal regime, and now, by resort to the
processes of the new legal order, can be enforced and protected. It is those rights and interests which are
recognised' in the common law.").
48
See Native Title Act, 1993, § 3 (stating the foremost object of the Act: "to provide for the
recognition and protection of native title.")
49
See, e.g., Native Title Act, 1993, § 44E (demarcating Federal Court jurisdiction).
50 Native Title Act, 1993, § 11.
51
The definition of native title under the NTA § 223 does differ in several instances from the
phrasing of Brennan in Mabo: e.g., rights and interests "in relation to land" has replaced "rights and
interests in land."
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rights and interests,52 whether native title rights and interests are beyond the
scope of what the common law can recognize,53 and if the ability of the
sovereign to regulate activities observed under traditional laws and customs
shall extinguish the recognizable native title rights and interests.5 4
As the first decade of native title's recognition came to a close,55 the
High Court in 2002 found it necessary to declare in Yorta Yorta that the
definition of native title is to be found exclusively in statute.56 The
announcement of this principle has been a serious source of controversy.
Noel Pearson has commented that the NTA definition of native title was
meant to be fluid, and that § 223(1)(c) was intended to enshrine native title as
"a faithful reflection" of the continuously developing definition of common
law jurisprudence.5 8 Indeed, the legislative history for both the NTA and the
Native Title Amendment Act of 1998 indicate that the Parliament of
Australia intended that "our [Aict preserve[] the fact of common law; who
holds native title, what it consists of is entirely a matter for the courts of

Australia. It is a common law right."59 Despite the reasonableness of
Pearson's interpretation, 60 modem native title practitioners must today accept
the High Court's emphatic declaration that the meaning of native title has its
foundation in NTA § 223(1), implementing common law native title

The Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1.
Commonwealth of Austl. v. Yarmirr (2001) 208 C.L.R. 1.
Yanner v. Eaton (1999) 201 C.L.R. 351.
Since Mabo v. Queensland I (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, native title applicants have witnessed a
change in Parliamentary leadership, the Native Title Amendment Act of 1998, and several more High
Court decisions tweaking our understanding of native title.
56
"To speak of the 'common law requirements' of native title is to invite fundamental error.
is not a creature of the common law, whether the Imperial common law as that existed at the
Native title
time of sovereignty and first settlement, or the Australian common law as it exists today. Native title, for
present purposes, is what is defined and described in s 223(1) of the Native Title Act. Mabo [No 2]
decided that certain rights and interests relating to land, and rooted in traditional law and custom, survived
the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty and radical title in Australia. It was this native title that was then
'recognised and protected' in accordance with the Native Title Act and which, thereafter, was not able to
be extinguished contrary to that Act." Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002)
214 C.L.R. 422, 453, 75.
57 See, e.g., Dr. Lisa Strelein, From Mabo to Yorta Yorta: Native Title Law in Australia, 19
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 225, 255 (characterizing the majority's conclusions of law in Yorta Yorta as an
"abdication of judicial responsibility").
58 Noel Pearson, "The High Court'sAbandonment of 'The Time-Honoured Methodology of the
Common Law' in its Interpretationof Native Title in Mirriuwung Gajerrong and Yorta Yorta," Sir Ninian
Stephen Annual Lecture 2003, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/joumals/AILR/2003/l5.html (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
59 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Senator Minchin, Commonwealth, ParliamentaryDebates,
Senate, 2 December 1997, 10171).
60 See Native Title Act, 1993, § 223(l)(c) (native title "rights and interests [exist only where]
recognised by the common law of Australia").
52
53
54
55
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jurisprudence6 rather as guideposts in trying to refine what § 223(1) means by
"native title." '
Though it may be judicially expedient to utilize a simplified
documented standard in cases of ancient rights surviving the arrival of the
common law,62 in doing so, the fairness of such a solution depends upon
interpretation of the NTA which is mindful of common law holdings,
especially the seminal exposition of Brennan in Mabo on the nature of native
title rights and interests. Mabo must be integral to the interpretation of the
NTA definition of native title whenever a debate over its meaning should
arise.6 3 Just as much as legislative history is typically central to statutory
interpretation, in the unique case of NTA, the direct derivation of § 223(1)
from Brennan J's very own words compels any judge who attempts to
interpret the meaning of native title's definition to contemplate Brennan J's
full thoughts on the nature and quality of native title. 64

61

See Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 451,

70 ("undue emphasis [should not be] given.., to what

was said in Mabo [No 2], at the expense of recognising the principal, indeed determinative, place that
should be given to the Native Title Act."). Id. 76 ("the reference in par (c) of s 223(1) to the rights or
interests being recognised by the common law of Australia cannot be understood as a form of drafting by
incorporation, by which some pre-existing body of the common law of Australia defining the rights or
interests known as native title is brought into the Act. To understand par (c) as a drafting device of that
kind would be to treat native title as owing its origins to the common law when it does not. And to speak
of there being common law elements for the establishment of native title is to commit the same error. It
is, therefore, wrong to read par (c) of the definition of native title as requiring reference to any such body
of common law, for there is none to which reference could be made.").
62
Cf Robert Hoyt, Nature and Origins of the Ancient Demesne, ENG. HiST. REV. 145, 146,
available at http://www.jstor.org/view/00138266/apO20255/O2aO0000/O (chronicling required use of the
Domesday Book in proof of ancient demesne established in 13th Century after a period in which
alternative proof had been permitted and detailing the long term development of "quibbles" between
lawyers and judges over whether a land could qualify for peculiar status ultimately displaced by an
objective standard of reference to the Domesday Book). But see Paul Vinogradoff, Villainage in
England: Essays in English Medieval History 66 (1892) (chronicling how Tenants of Tavistock in
Devonshire were harmed by prohibitive and strict use of the Domesday, an interesting comparison to the
current issue).
63
"No doubt account may be taken of what was decided and what was said in [Mabo [No 2]]
when considering the meaning and effect of the NTA. This is especially so when it is recognised that pars
(a) and (b) of s 223(1) plainly are based on what was said by Brennan in Mabo [No 2]." W. Austl. v.
Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1,
16. But cf Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria,
(2002) 214 C.L.R. 422, 460,
104 (Gaudron & Kirby, JJ.) (accepting statute but refusing to read
"substantially maintained" into its requirements).
6
Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 487, 172 (Callinan, J.). Even though Judge Olney was implicitly
found to have erred in his statement that "223 [merely] provides a definition of native title for the
purposes of the Native Title Act, "his failure to accord the statute its proper weight was not a prejudicial
error of law, for he did correctly assess that "it is necessary to understand the context in which [§ 223(1)]
was developed and to do this it is of assistance to refer briefly to several passages from the judgments in
Mabo No 2. Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Comnunity v. The State of Victoria & Ors [1998]
F.C.A. 1606, 13.
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Admittedly, the High Court in Yorta Yorta found that the trial judge
had emphasized Mabo's "rules" too much over the elements of NTA § 223.65
The fact, however, that the High Court fashioned a new test for "traditional
connection" analysis-a test which fabricated several common law tools to
inquire into the existence of an eligible "normative system"-for the sake of
guiding lower courts in interpreting NTA § 223, implies that the conceptual
guidelines of Mabo can be implemented for judicial interpretation. The
majority decision in Ward only a few months earlier clearly affirms use of
Mabo for interpretation of § 223(1).66
The allowance of Mabo into native title proceedings today is
absolutely essential, for there are deficiencies in the "traditional connection"
test from Yorta Yorta. In Part R we will return to the practical shortcomings
of applying Yorta Yorta alone to evidence relevant to proof of a traditional
connection in relation to land, especially as the exclusive use of that test in
Jango proves ultimately to be unsatisfactory. First, however, it is necessary
to understand how the High Court of Australia constructed its "traditional
connection" test in Yorta Yorta. The next section demonstrates why it is
incumbent upon the Federal Courts to augment the lessons from Yorta Yorta
with the guidance of Brennan in Mabo to understand whether a native title
claim group has preserved its traditional laws and customs in relation to land
successfully.
B. The Limitations of Yorta Yorta: The New Testfor a "Traditional
Connection" and the Unknown Consequences of Change
In its substantive elements, § 223(1)(b) requires that native title
claimants demonstrate, "by [traditional] laws and customs ... a connection
with land or waters." Although the native title claimants in Yorta Yorta
insisted that § 223(l)(b) meant "the rights and interests presently possessed
under traditional laws presently acknowledged and customs presently
observed,
to a present
by those laws and Customs,"' 6 7 the
High
Courtand
nevertheless
ruledconnection
that:

65

See Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 451,

70 (noting it "may be that undue emphasis was given in

the reasons to what was said in Mabo [No 2], at the expense of recognising the principal, indeed
determinative, place that should be given to the Native Title Act").
66 "No doubt account may be taken of what was decided and what was said in [Mabo [No 2)]
when considering the meaning and effect of the NTA. This is especially so when it is recognised that pars
(a) and (b) of s 223(1) plainly are based on what was said by Brennan in Mabo [No 2]." W. Austl. v. Ward
(2002) 213 C.L.R. 1, 65, 16.
67 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422, 438, 1 28.
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[I]t would be wrong to confine the inquiry for connection between
claimants and the land or waters concerned to an inquiry about the
connection said to be demonstrated by the laws and customs which are
shown now to be acknowledged and observed by the peoples

concerned. Rather, it will be necessary to inquire about the relationship
between the laws and customs now acknowledged and observed, and
those that were acknowledged and observed before sovereignty, and to
do so by considering whether the laws and customs can be said to be
the laws and customs of the society whose laws
and customs are
68
properly described as traditional laws and customs.
As much as the High Court in Yorta Yorta might have been critical
of the trial judge's reliance upon Mabo in defining native title, it too could
not avoid fabricating a new common law test in Yorta Yorta to discern
whether the necessary "traditional connection" existed. 69 The High Court
majority formulated that the "normative system, 70 which constitutes
traditional laws and customs could not have validly created new rights and
interests in land after the assertion of British sovereignty. 7 1 Were the
indigenous normative system to engage in "parallel law-making" after the
British Crown acquired sovereignty, the rights and interests in relation to
land would lose their "traditional" aspect and cease to be recognizable under
NTA § 223(1)(c). 72 The court did recognize, however, that "significant
adaptations" to traditional laws and customs could have occurred in
accordance with NTA § 223(1)(b), insofar as such changes were
"developments . . . of a kind contemplated by [] traditional law and
' 73

Furthermore, the High Court precluded recognition of any native
title rights and interests where traditional laws and customs had been ceased
and then reassumed: "acknowledgment and observance of [traditional] laws
and customs 4 must have continued substantially uninterrupted since
7
sovereignty.
Although Chief Justice Gleeson, Justice Gummow, and Justice
Hayne muse how "the definition of native title take[s] account of whether
there has been some modification of or adaptation to traditional law and
custom.

Id. at 447, 56.
Native Title Act, 1993, §223(1)(b).
See Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. at 443, 42 (explaining that the system must have "normative
rules," as opposed to "mere observable patterns of behaviour" to qualify as having "normative content").
71 Id. at 443, 43.
68

69
70

72

Id. at 443-44,

73
74

Id. at 443, 44.
Id. at 456,187.

44.
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custom, or some interruption in the exercise of native title rights and
interests, 7 5 in Yorta Yorta they only demonstrate how to answer the latter
half of that inquiry, providing only piecemeal guidelines regarding the
analysis of modification of tradition. Indeed, the High Court merely poses
the issue without any further guidance: "Isthe change or adaptation of such a
kind that it can no longer be said that the rights or interests asserted are
possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and the traditional
76
customs observed . . . ?,,
The remainder of the majority decision is
dedicated exclusively to the issue of an interruption to tradition.77
The High Court majority did not resolve both the theoretical
problems which it raised because the facts peculiar to the native title claim
advanced in Yorta Yorta did not provide occasion to examine whether
change to tradition had occurred. Only an apparent interruption to the
traditional laws and customs of the indigenous claim group was at issue. 78
The native title claim was denied by the trial judge due to his conclusion
that:
[I]n the context of a native title claim the absence of a continuous link
back to the laws and customs of the original inhabitants deprives those
activities of the character of traditional laws acknowledged and
traditional customs observed in relation to land and waters which is a
necessary element of both the statutory and the common law concept of
native title rights and interests.79

After the Full Court affirmed Olney J's ruling, 80 the High Court
clarified that it was only reviewing:
[F]indings about interruption in observance of traditional law and
custom not about the content of or changes in that law or custom ....
More fundamentally than that, they were findings that the society
which had once observed traditional laws and customs had ceased to do

75
76

Id. at 454, 78.
Id. at 455, 183.
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422, 455-59, It

77
84-97.
78 Id. 95. "These findings were findings about interruption in observance of traditional law and
custom not about the content of or changes in that law or custom." Id.
79 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. The State of Victoria & Ors (1998) F.C.A.
1606 at 128, 125.
60
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. The State of Victoria & Ors (2001) 110
F.C.R. 244.

13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & Soc. JUST. 2 (2007)
the society out of
so and, by ceasing to do so, no longer constituted
81
which the traditional laws and customs sprang.
Thus, no comprehensive test exists by which lower courts may
decide, in evaluating a modification of or adaptation to traditional laws and
customs, whether "the origins of the content of the law or custom concerned
are to be found in the normative rules of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander societies
that existed before the assertion of sovereignty by the
82
British Crown.,
C.

Extending the doctrine of Yorta Yorta: permissible adaptationsand
self-extinguishing "parallellaw-making"

The majority in Yorta Yorta articulated so generalized a standard for
analyzing change to tradition that its "traditional connection" test fails to
provide lower courts with the guidance necessary to analyze whether the
evidence reflects a permissible adaptation or an impermissible "parallel lawmaking. '83 Although the court noted that "[a]ccount may have to be taken of
developments at least of a kind contemplated by that traditional law and
"parallel lawcustom, ''84 it failed to distinguish in any way what constitutes
' 85
making" and what qualifies as "significant adaptations."
Notably absent from the majority's expressed test of whether
traditional laws and customs have been preserved is Justice Brennan's
seminal explication in Mabo, that:
Where a clan or group has continued to acknowledge the laws and (so
far as practicable) to observe the customs based on the traditions of that
clan or group, whereby their traditional connexion with the land has
been substantially maintained, the traditional community
title of that
86
clan or group can be said to remain in existence.

81
82
83

84
85

Yorta Yorta , 214 CLR at 458, 95
Id. at 444, 1 46.
Id. at 443-44, H 43-44.
Id. 43-44.
See id. (articulating that "significant adaptations" to traditional law and custom may be

recognized, but emphasizing in the next sentence that "sovereignty by the British Crown necessarily
entailed ... that there could thereafter be no parallel law-making system in the territory over which it
asserted sovereignty.").
86
Mabo v. Queensland 11(1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 59-60.
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Even though the majority decision in Ward clearly affirms use of
Mabo for interpretation of § 223(1)(b) and the majority in Yorta Yorta
expressly derives from Mabo its concept of "normative" rules, which it
introduced for the sake of interpreting NTA § 223(l)(b),8 8 it failed to relate
its own analytical test, introducing concepts such as "normative system,"
"parallel law-making," and "significant adaptation," to Mabo' s "substantially
maintained" test.
Much of the reason for omission of the "substantially maintained"
standard by the High Court majority in Yorta Yorta would appear to be the
dissent of Judges Kirby and Gaudron, who were confounded at the use of
such a phrase by the trial judge when it does not appear in the actual text of §
223.89 Perhaps the dissent might have found acquiescence in the majority's
statement that "undue emphasis was given [by the primary judge] to what
was said in Mabo [No 2], at the expense of recognising the principal, indeed
determinative, place that should be given to the Native Title Act." 90 In
addressing whether an interruption to the exercise of native title rights and
interests had occurred, however, the majority in fact articulated an extremely
specific application of the Mabo standardby adopting "the proposition that
acknowledgment [of traditional laws] and observance [of traditional
customs] must have continued substantiallyuninterrupted ...."91
Despite this clear application of precedent, failure to reaffirm the
Mabo test explicitly in Yorta Yorta has led to variegated application of
common law precedents in several recent Federal Court decisions related to
92
issues of modification of or adaptation to traditional laws and customs.
The High Court's failure to affirm to the broader test of Mabo for a
"traditional connexion . . . substantially maintained" 93 has misled some

judges, perhaps out of fear of being overturned, to avoid use of the
"substantially maintained" test altogether.94 Failure to implement Brennan
J's original "substantially maintained" test alongside the new terms of art
87

"No doubt account may be taken of what was decided and what was said in [Mabo [No 211

when considering the meaning and effect of the NTA. This is especially so when it is recognised that pars
(a) and (b) of s 223(1) plainly are based on what was said by Brennan in Mabo [No 2 Mabo [No 2]." W.
Austl. v. Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1, 65, 16.
89 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422, 442, 40.
89 Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. 422, 460, 1 104.
90 Id. at 451, 70.
9
Id. at 456, 89 (emphasis added).
92 See, e.g., Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) 152 F.C.R. 150; Griffiths v. N. Territory of
Austl. (2006) F.C.A. 903.
93 Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 59, 66.
94 Jango, 152 F.C.R. at 348-49, W 783-87.
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established by the majority in Yorta Yorta could mislead trial judges even
further by focusing their analysis upon the extent to which change to
tradition has occurred, rather than upon the extent to which traditional laws
and customs have been preserved. In Part I, the difficult task of weighing
together the disparate forms of evidence typical to native title claims is
reviewed through the specific application, on the one hand, of the "traditional
connection" test from Yorta Yorta by Judge Sackville in Jango,95 and, on the
other hand, of the combined guidance from the High Court decisions in both
Mabo and Yorta Yorta by Judge Weinberg in Griffiths.96 This comparison
demonstrates that the significant amount of variance that can result between
these divergent approaches can prejudice a native title claim if the factfinder
seeks merely to find excessive and disqualifying change to tradition, rather
than to identify how the native title claimants have preserved their traditional
normative system. Frankly, as Part IHwill show later, the former method
endows the trial judge with such arbitrary discretion to evaluate the disparate
forms of evidence relevant to the "traditional connection" to land that an
individual judge could arguably infer excessive transformation in every case,
threatening to allow willing trial judges to interpret Yorta Yorta in such a
way that "no native title claim could ever succeed. . . .97
III. PartII: The Weighing of Evidence Pertainingto TraditionalLaws and
Customs: JudicialPracticesObserved, and Reforms Recommended
A. Yorta Yorta as Precedent:Into Jango and Griffiths
The failure in Yorta Yorta to incorporate explicitly the "substantially
maintained" standard of Mabo has caused several courts to analyze questions
of modification of or adaptation to traditional laws and customs through
differing interpretations of the "traditional connection" requirement of NTA
§ 223(1)(b). Although Yorta Yorta has provided several pointed guidelines
(of varying precision) from which Federal judges might begin evaluating
modification of or adaptation to traditional laws and customs, ultimately
these instructions are so generalized that a troubling inexactness is evident in
comparing their respective application in Jango and Griffiths. How could
their respective Federal judges reached completely divergent interpretations
of nearly identical facts?
Jango, 152 F.C.R. at 261-62,
393-97.
Griffiths, F.C.A. 903 91 638-52, http://www.austlii.edu.au//cgi-bin/disp.pVau/cases/cth/
federal-ct/2006/903.htrml?query=griffiths%20v.%2northern%20territory%20of%2australia (last visited
on Feb. 16, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
97 Id. 432.
95
96
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1. Similar issues, divergent analyses
At the root of the continuity question in Jango and Griffiths, there is
a remarkable similarity in controversy. In essence, in both cases:
The issue that divides the parties is simply whether there has been a
fundamental change in the normative system that underlies the
acquisition of native title, from a patrilineal descent system to a
cognatic descent system, and if so, whether that prevents the present
claimants from maintaining a traditional connection
with the land, in
98
accordance with traditional laws and customs.

The conclusions of fact reached by the respective justices were
identical: a patrilineal system was found to have become much broader in its
allowance of who might acquire rights through descent and birth. 99 Their
respective conclusions of law, however, in light of Yorta Yorta's broadly
articulated standards for modification of or adaptation to tradition, were
completely divergent. 0o
In Jango, Judge Sackville, implementing the "significant adaptation"
test of Yorta Yorta in the absence of Mabo's "substantially maintained" test,
found that a change from a patrilineal system of descent governing the
transmission of native title rights to a broader "cognatic" practice today is too
great to be considered continuous from pre-colonial fights and interests. 1 1
His Honour presumed that such a transition must constitute the "parallel lawmaking" 0 2 that shall have negatived their claims. 10 3 Judge Weinberg, on the
Griffiths v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) F.C.A. 903,

560; cf Jango v. N. Territory of Austl.
(2006) 152 F.C.R. 150, 205, 9 223-24 (articulating the claimant's rejection of patrilineal system
hypothesis proffered in government submissions).
99
Griffiths, F.C.A. 903 1 560 (explaining that "biological descent need not be patrilineal"); cf
Jango, 152 F.C.R. at 198,
193 (recognizing that "the High Court in Yorta Yorta [established] that
interruption to the use and enjoyment of native title rights and interests is not necessarily fatal to
establishing present (or in this case recent) possession of such rights and interests ....
").
100 Griffiths, F.C.A. 903 560 (concluding, "there is no real dispute in this case as to the ancestral
connection between what might be termed 'the original native title holders,' and the present claimants").
Cf Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. [2006] 152 F.C.R. at 205,
150 (resolving that "if the evidence
supports the proposition that the traditional laws and customs of the eastern Western Desert adopt a
patrilineal model of land tenure, their claims cannot succeed.").
101 Jango, 152 F.C.R. at 205,
223-24.
102
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422, 443-44, V91
43-44 (referencing the joint opinion of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ which concluded that once
sovereignty was asserted, there could be no parallel law-making system; as a result, the only rights or
interests that would be recognized as native title rights after the date of the assertion of sovereignty are
those that find their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom).
98
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other hand, makes full use in Griffiths of Mabo's "substantially maintained"
standard' °4 and considers the incipient principles of Yorta Yorta in order to
find that the perceived change from a patrilineal system of descent to a
bilateral/cognatic system was an adaptation of a kind contemplated under
traditional laws and customs.' 1 5 The major difference in identifying the
issues at stake in Griffiths and Jango lies in these distinct analytical reference
points. For Judge Sackville, the mere existence of a significant change in
traditional laws and customs could be seized for the sake of denying native
title claims. 10 6 Where Judge Sackville's analysis stopped, Judge Weinberg
asked the further question-whether the identified change to traditional laws
and customs has fundamentally transformed the pre-colonial normative
system beyond the contemplation of traditional laws and customs. 10 7 The
need to resolve this analytical discrepancy is pressing.
2.

ElucidatingReform: calibratingthe weight of evidence in
native title claims

The fundamental lacuna in Yorta Yorta's guidelines for analyzing the
impact of changes in tradition upon a native title claim is the failure to advise
the lower courts of recommendations in the weighing of evidence. Although,
clearly, we do not contest that "[i]t is not possible to offer any single bright
line test for deciding what inferences may be drawn or when they may be
drawn, any more than it is possible to offer such a test for deciding what
changes or adaptations are significant,"' 1 8 the discretion of Federal judges
who weigh evidence must be better informed by the High Court regarding
the nature of the evidence which they are to weigh.
The disparate manners in which evidence was weighed in Jango and
Griffiths cries out for much more comprehensive standards for weighing
anthropological data and indigenous witness testimony than was suggested in
Yorta Yorta.1°9 Though the High Court majority in Yorta Yorta touched
upon a few requirements of lower courts in weighing indigenous oral
testimony and documentary ethnographic accounts, its decision has failed to
correlate sufficiently these disparate forms of analysis. The nature of
Jango, 152 F.C.R. at 205,
223-24.
104 Griffiths v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) F.C.A. 903, 517 (citing N. Territory v. Alyawarr
(2005) 145 FCR 135,
87-93).
105 Id.
106 Jango v. N. Territory of AustI. (2006) 152 F.C.R. 150, 288-90, In 497-507.
107
Griffiths, F.C.A. 903 9N 577-84.
108 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422.
109 Id. at 447-51, n 57-70.
103
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ethnographic data has not yet been adequately recognized by Australianth
common law. Oral testimony and ethnographic accounts from the late 19
or early 2 0 h century tend to diverge, not simply due to an evident change in
traditional laws and customs, but often because of a failure of the Western
ethnographer to obtain an accurate understanding of native customs and
traditions. The rudimentary theoretical foundations of early anthropology
were severely misinformed by their Europocentric conceptions of concrete
0 Anthropology has in recent decades
categories of how a society is formed.°"
come to reform these pitfalls of earlier generations with great vigor."' At
the same time, however, this project of reform has been such an extreme
reaction to "classical" ethnography that the increasing refusal of many
contemporary anthropologists to adhere to any 2empirical standard has
rendered their opinions valueless in a court of law. 1
Thus, trial judges, whose Western legal training is intrinsically
incapable of comprehending the complex nature of indigenous Australian
land systems relevant to native title proceedings, continue to reserve
discretionary authority in treating the distinct forms of evidence relevant to
native title. l13 The next section demonstrates the iniquitous treatment
between indigenous oral evidence and ethnographic documentation is
demonstrated. The generous inference always granted to ethnographic
documentary evidence is too often coupled with the irrational hesitancy of
110 See PETER SUTTON, NATIVE TITLE IN AUSTRALIA: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE, 137-38
(describing shift in anthropological theory from cripplingly rigid formalism to improved recognition of
fluidity in non-Western social structures during the 1970s).
III See id. at 138 ("There has been a positive and general shift in Australianist anthropology away
from structuralist emphases on relatively rigid social and cultural forms ...towards greater recognition of
their negotiability and fluidity as meanings.").
12
See generally id. at 144-46 (beseeching contemporary anthropologists to teach multiple
"modes" of ethnographic theory, for the sake of fostering greater judicial reception of anthropological
experts).
113 For example, despite a rare but clear warning in Yorta Yorta against "the impermissible
premise that written evidence about a subject is inherently better or more reliable than oral testimony on
the same subject, Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. 422, 449, 63, Judge Sackville in Jango blatantly contradicts
the High Court majority by asserting, "in the absence of a written tradition, there are no indigenous
documentary records that enable the Court to ascertain the laws and customs followed by Aboriginal
people at sovereignty. While Aboriginal witnesses may be able to recount the content of laws and
customs acknowledged and observed in the past, the collective memory of living people will not extend
back for 170 or 180 years." Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) 152 F.C.R. 150, 279-80, 462. This,
he presumes, is why "anthropological evidence [is necessary] to establish the link between current laws
and customs (or those observed in the recent past) and the laws and customs acknowledged and observed
by the claimants' predecessors at the time of sovereignty." Id. Judge Sackville ultimately denied the
claim in Jango on account of the superior position he impermissibly granted to anthropological evidence
from early 20th century ethnographies. Such a defect in Jango merely scratches the surface of the
difficulties encountered in weighing the complex evidence typical to native title proceedings.
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many trial judges to afford a comparable inference to indigenous oral
evidence. Connecting anthropologists to judicial rationality for the sake of
better informing the court upon the relationship between oral evidence
presented by indigenous witnesses and older ethnographic accounts is the
subject of the remainder of Part H. External expertise must obtain a greater
role in native title proceedings so that administration of justice may be
rational and accurate in ascertaining if the traditional nature indigenous laws
and customs have been preserved.
B. The trouble with history as evidence:finding equality in the use of legal
inference to presume historicalfact
The relevant criterion to be applied in deciding the significance of
change to, or adaptation of, traditional law or custom is readily stated
(though its application to particular facts may well be difficult). The
key question is whether the law and custom can still be seen to be
traditional law and traditional custom. Is the change or adaptation of
such a kind that it can no longer be said that the rights or interests
asserted are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and the
traditional customs observed by the relevant peoples
when that
14
expression is understood in the sense earlier identified?
Indeed, though the standard might be easy to restate, there is great
obstacle in applying it to the proof normally pertaining to whether the
indigenous laws and customs found in contemporary practice can be seen to
be the traditional laws and customs existing at the time British sovereignty
came over the lands in question. Though documentary evidence from the
19th century that is typically ethnographic or anthropological in nature does
exist, it is unbelievably rare for any such data to extend back to the moment
of sovereignty.
In many cases it is even impossible for any relevant documentation
to exist. In Jango, for example, though the relevant date of sovereignty is
1825, the earliest documentary evidence, on the other hand, could not
precede the first explorers to the region, who arrived in 1873. 15 Sovereignty
in Grifiths was also found to have been asserted in 1825, but the first
anthropologist to have carried out "detailed empirical research" was
Professor Stanner, who visited the relevant communities no earlier than

Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422, 455, 83.
See Jango 152 F.C.R. 150, 180-81, 1 110 ("The earliest European explorations of the Uluru
region were in 1873, by the explorers William Gosse and Ernest Giles.").
114
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NATIVE TITLE IN THE WAKE OF YORTA YORTA

1934!116 Out of sheer necessity, fact-finders in native title claims must make
inferences to bridge the gap between the earliest documentary evidence and
the date of sovereignty which is the legally relevant date." 7 If federal judges
in their discretion were to decide that no claim should succeed if evidence
did not demonstrate tradition dating back to the moment of sovereignty,
in the Northern Territory, or
indeed, "no native title claim could ever succeed
8
1
Australia."
of
part
other
perhaps in any
The evidentiary problem affecting analysis of change to traditional
laws and customs arises when the fact-finder must evaluate the
anthropological and ethnographic records for the sake of the law, and then
also weigh the content of such European writings with indigenous witness
testimony recollecting oral traditions in great part. Though the courts appear
comfortable in affording an inference in favor of ethnographies towards the
date of sovereignty, the skepticism of many judges will presume not to afford
the same inference to indigenous testimony. Had Judge Sackville not
mistakenly declared his use of the presumption against oral tradition
specifically forbidden in Yorta Yorta,"1 9 his bias against oral tradition could
have hidden behind the shield of discretion. This iniquitous possibility ought
not to threaten native title claimants.
Relying upon common law evidentiary practice dating back to feudal
England, Judge Weinberg in Griffiths has justified an inference in favor of
native title claimants: For the sake of fairness, traditional laws and customs
may be inferred from a cultural tradition of oral history in limited instances
of customary land use:
Referring to the difficulty that the evidence could not literally take
the Court back as far as 1788, [Selway J] observed (at [197]):
"This problem is one that is well known to the common law. There are a
number of circumstances where it was necessary at common law to

establish proof of custom dating back not just to the 1 8th century, but to
'time immemorial'. Proofof copyhold was one example ... Another, ... was

the proof of ancient custom as a means of establishingeither prescription
or ancient lost grant 'from time immemorial."'
16
See Griffiths v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) F.C.A. 903, 271 ("Professor Stanner was the
first anthropologist to carry out detailed empirical research in the area. As a young man he visited Timber
Creek for about a week in August or September 1934.").
17
See, e.g., Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. 422 (leaving trial judge's use of ethnographies dated well
after sovereignty unchallenged, much less undisturbed).
11
Griffiths, F.C.A. 903, 432.
19
SUtrroN, supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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His Honour noted that, like the evidence called to prove aboriginal custom,
the evidence called to prove the existence of a custom from "time
immemorial" for the purposes of the common law was often oral evidence
and it was subject to the same difficulties in relating that evidence backalthough not just to the eighteenth century, but to the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. In practice, those difficulties were ameliorated by the readiness
of the common law courts to infer from proof of the existence of a current
custom that that custom had continued from time immemorial. The
inference was a strong one: Hammerton v. Honey (1876) 24 WR 603 at 604
per Jessell MR.
There is no reason why the same evidentiary inference is not available for
the purpose of proving the existence of aboriginal custom and tradition at
the date of sovereignty.120

Certainly the inference need not always be afforded. However, in
the absence of contrary evidence, such oral evidence in itself should suffice

to establish a connection between traditional laws and customs and
contemporary practice. It is where the oral testimony and the ethnographic
data of documented history conflict that this inference shall face a substantial
challenge, against which it may or may not ultimately survive into the
findings of fact.
C. Ethnographicdata, expert anthropologists,and indigenous oral history:
How should legal analysis of traditionallaws and customs ruminate the
anthropologicalview of culture?
1. The common law must come to define the utility and the role of
anthropologicalexpertise in interpretingevidence relevant to native title
The High Court in Yorta Yorta noted that "[niative title is not a
creature of the common law." 121 Sadly, the common lawyer and judge for
the most part has been unable to situate his knowledge beyond the formal
training of Western law and letters for the sake of more accurate
comprehension of native Australian customs and society. The significant
role afforded to anthropologists in native title cases, such as Jango and
Griffiths, indicates some redress of this ignorance in the common law;
however, the weighing of anthropological expertise today not only suffers
from a lack of systematic treatment from judges, but also the fact that the
120 See Griffiths, F.C.A. 903,
578-80 (citing Gumana v. N. Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457).
121
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422, 1 75.
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broad spectrum of anthropological theory has not yet been translated
precisely into terms familiar to the common law. Anthropology is a field
founded conceptually in contradistinction to native title law,122 and thereby it
must find proper expression in the courtroom for the courts to comprehend,
adopt, and integrate anthropological understanding of native Australia into
native title case law.
If anthropology is the study of culture, the anthropologist should
initially feel slighted to discover that nowhere in the statutory definition of
native title or the statutory requirements of a native title determination is
"culture" or "society" even mentioned. Since Yorta Yorta, though, the High
Court has cemented "society" into the native title vocabulary 123 and the place
of anthropologists at the center of the evaluation of traditional laws and
customs. This insertion of social science into native title claims has been
disconcertingly haphazard so far, and thus the rules for weighing
anthropological evidence have not yet attained a sufficient standardization in
the four years since Yorta Yorta was decided. Quite frankly, the complexity
of anthropology's inconsistent theorizing about "society" and "culture" over
the last 140 years is making quite clear that native title claims require more
of expert testimony and the ethnographic facts upon
standardized treatment
124
which they rely.
Furthermore, the very nature of defining native title and determining
whether it exists in a given case creates another fundamental obstacle to
reconciling anthropological conceptions with the legal principles that provide
native title recognition under the common law.
The difficulty of expressing a relationship between a community or
group of Aboriginal people and the land in terms of rights and interests
is evident. Yet that is required by the NTA. The spiritual or religious is
translated into the legal. This requires the fragmentation of an
integrated view of the ordering of affairs into rights and interests which
apart from the duties and obligations which go with
are considered
25
them. 1

122 See W. Austl. v. Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1, 64-65, 1 14 (acknowledging that the fractured
view which the common law takes of indigenous Australian laws and customs relating to native title does
not faithfully reflect the holistic nature of culture).
123 Yorta Yorta, 214 C.L.R. 422, 445, 49.
124 As much as some anthropologists may cringe and this prospect of limitations, the federal
courtroom has a place only for those experts willing to correlate their conclusions to the evidence relevant
to the native title claim before the court.
125 Ward, 213 C.L.R. l, 64, 14.
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The integrated viewpoints of anthropological experts and
ethnographies shall not fragment naturally or neatly for the sake of native
title claims. Verily, in native title claims especially, lawyers should be
"involved in the writing of the reports by experts: not, of course, in relation
to the substance of the reports (in particular, in arriving at the opinions to be
expressed); but in relation to their form, in order to ensure that the legal tests
of admissibility are addressed."'' 26 In communicating anthropological
knowledge of traditional laws and customs, experts must be able to translate
the relevant ethnographic data into a legally comprehensible conclusion to
the question: have the native title claimants substantially maintained the laws
and customs of their ancestors, who were present at the time of British
sovereignty, that contemporary practices may be considered "traditional"?
Alas, both judges and anthropologist expert witnesses have not yet
come to conceive of what is fundamentally necessary for the content of
anthropological expert opinions or ethnographic data to be analyzedth
properly. For example, the primary judge in Yorta Yorta relied upon late 19
and early 20th century ethnographies, due to the absence of meaningful
expert interpretation by a present-day anthropologist.127
Most
anthropologists will find this shocking due to theoretical developments in the
field since the 1970s.128 What anthropological expert witnesses generally
fail to understand are the evidentiary requirements of the law that their expert
opinions and conclusions be based upon evidence submitted in relation to the
particular traditional laws and customs at issue. When Judge Olney observes
that "[t]he Court has derived little assistance from the testimony of the
various experts who have given evidence in this proceeding and this because
apart from the recorded observations of Curr and Robinson, much of the
evidence was based upon speculation," 129 it exemplifies the common failure
of anthropologists to provide legally helpful interpretations of the evidence
before the Court.
As much as it must disturb present day Australian anthropologists to
learn the ethnographic conclusions of the colonial period, which have been
criticized in their fundamental premises and identified to be in need of
serious theoretical revision, they are often given more weight in native title
126

See Risk v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) F.C.A. 404,

456 (citing Harrington-Smith on behalf

of the Wongatha People v. State of W. Austl. (No 2) (2003) F.C.A. 893, 19).
127 See Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. The State of Victoria & Ors (1998)
F.C.A. 1606, 106 (stating that the oral testimony of witnesses is further evidence but, being based upon
oral tradition extending over two hundred years, such testimony should be given less weight then
scholarly writings).
128 SuTroN, supra note 110.
129 Yorta Yorta, F.C.A. 1606, 54.
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proceedings than their own modem interpretations of culture. 30 The basic
logical requirement of the Australian common law that "all the facts assumed
by the expert as the basis for his or her opinion [correspond to] those proved
or admitted'' 131 condemns the uninhibitedly speculative postmodernist
emphasis growing within the academic discipline of anthropology to
continue its existence outside the realm of beneficial utility in native title
claims. 132 Even though "it is easy for [anthropologists] now to identify the
distorting effects of the assumptions and values of the ethnographers of a
century ago ... there seems to have been a serious decline in the extent to
which empirical rigor is required of an academic ethnographer and
anthropological writer in recent decades."'' 33 The common law will not
tolerate postmodernist ethnography spouting unstructured discourse
immaterial to deciding native title claims; "[ble all that as it may, the Court
must address the evidence that is before it and to the extent that
it admits of
34
firm findings, make such findings as are relevant to the case." 1
Modem anthropologists who participate in native title claims must
articulate a clear critique of ethnographic evidence which was collected prior
to the academy-wide awakening upon publication of Anthropology and the
Colonial Encounter and the like during the 1970s.135 It is fundamental for
every anthropological expert witness to explain that great care must be taken
to avoid vesting too much reliance upon older ethnographies merely for the
fact that they have preserved interpretive observations in writing.'36 In fact,
the court must be asked to understand that the limitations of ethnographic
observation under the guise of objective research have led to the "corrective"
undertaking by the contemporary generation of anthropologists. Primary
judges in native title claims cannot be presumed to know that Australianist
anthropology has shifted "away from structuralist emphases on relatively
130

See, e.g., Yorta Yorta F.C.A.

1606 (presuming

uncritically that nineteenth

century

ethnographic documentary evidence is anthropologically accurate).
13" See Risk v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) F.C.A. 404, 1455 (citing Harrington-Smith on behalf
of the Wongatha People v. State of W. Austl. (No 2) (2003) F.C.A. 893, 24).
132 See generally SUTTON, supra note 110 and accompanying text.
133 Id. at 145.
134 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. The State of Victoria & Ors [1998] 1606
F.C.A 54.
135 See SUTTON, supra note 110, at 138 (describing the anti-Europocentric revision of
Australianist anthropology).
136 See, e.g., Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. [2006] 152 F.C.R. 150, 1 477 (testifying on the
patrilineal modes of descent, Professor Sutton described that, "the anthropological accounts, prior to the
work of Myers in the 1970s and 1980s, were: 'coloured by some bias towards the search for order and
structure and tended, for example, to give too much emphasis to the ideological statements of older men
in contrast with the attention given to the messier realities of the case material"').
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rigid social and cultural forms, and on cellular and segmentary analyses of
those forms as if they were objects in space-time, towards greater recognition
of their negotiability and fluidity as meanings. "' 37 It is incumbent upon
experts to explain the academy-wide critique of earlier ethnographic
premises and theories and the need to revise such interpretations through a
modem lens.
2. The relative weight of ethnographic data and indigenous
interviews/testimony in relation to expert anthropologicalinterpretations
More importantly, anthropological expert witnesses must remain
within the evidence relevant to the proceeding at hand; to do otherwise shall
always lead to the dismissive complaint by Olney j.1 38

However, the

exercise of a similar complaint in Jango by Judge Sackville is utterly
incorrect. His Honour's dismissal of Professor Sutton's Report and expert
testimony suffers from an improper evaluation of ethnographic materials in
relation to Professor Sutton's contemporary anthropological interpretation of
relevant historical data collected in older ethnographic materials. Although
His Honour does provide some reasoned explanation to find that Sutton
failed to review completely the relevant ethnographic data collected by
Tindale, he fails to address the superior nature of Sutton's report in the
context of the native title proceeding itself. Not only did his report reassess a
great deal of Tindale's ethnographic data (inter al.) to determine that a
broader cognatic kinship system existed as far back as ethnographers
recorded relevant data, but, more importantly, Professor Sutton also weighed
oral evidence from the claimants. 139 Even though His Honour does articulate
the premise that "the evidence of the Aboriginal witnesses provides the most
important evidence in a native title case, '14° Judge Sackville's refusal to
consider that the indigenous oral tradition presented in testimony could
extend to the moment of sovereignty is an error of law that exerts a
prejudicial reliance in error upon Tindale over Sutton and several other
ethnographic accounts.
The fundamental defect in Judge Sackville's according greater
weight to Tindale's ethnographic records is his failure to account for the fact
SUTrroN, supra note 110, at 138.
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. The State of Victoria & Ors [1998] F.C.A.

137
138

1606,

54.

See Jango, 152 F.C.R.
312 (commencing field work for his research, Sutton and Ms.
Vaarzon-Morel completed a joint report that entailed at least 398 days of 'desk research' and 'nonethnographic interviews' and 99 days of 'ethnographic field work').
140
Id. at 152 F.C.R. 288.
139
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that Professor Sutton is familiar with both the claimants in the case before
the court and with the legal questions involving the continuity of traditional
laws and customs in the native title claim at hand. Sutton's familiarity
makes his report fundamentally superior to freestanding ethnographies
written in an earlier period of unreformed social theory long. Were Professor
Sutton's Report to be insufficient in its correlation to the evidence on record,
then Judge Sackville's error would not be prejudicial. However, Judge
Sackville' s several errors bring into question his very findings of fact, which
must first be rectified before any court may review the extent to which the
Sutton Report contains "correspondence between all the facts assumed by
the
' 41
expert as the basis for his or her opinion, and those proved or admitted."'
Professor Sutton is, in fact, one of the most well prepared
anthropologists for answering the questions which the Australian common
law poses, as evidenced by his extensive work at the intersection of
anthropology and law.142 His efforts to bring a common vocabulary where
these professions overlap provide the leading contemporary example of the
direction in which anthropological expert testimony must foray. Though
Sutton has not perfected the translation of anthropological theory into
relevant legal evidence, his contribution has been foremost in attempting to
educate anthropologists about the need for fact intensive143analysis if judges
are to find their interpretive conclusions at all persuasive.
Conversely, judges must come to better understand the enormous
potential that anthropological interpretations may hold for their evaluation of
evidence and findings of fact.
3. The advantageof anthropologicalinquiry in understandingindigenous
evidence for native title
In Yorta Yorta, the High Court failed to address how primary judges
should evaluate ethnographic writings and how primary judges should
approach present-day anthropological expert witnesses who may evaluate the
quality of those writings. The fact that present-day anthropologists directly
interact with native title claimants should provide their expert opinions with

141 See Risk v. N. Territory of Austl. [2006] F.C.A. 404, [457] (citing Harrington-Smith on behalf
of the Wongatha People v. State of W. Austl. (No 2) (2003) F.C.A. 893, in 24-25).
142 See generally SUTrON, supra note 110 (pioneering the intersection of Australianist

anthropology and the law of native title).
143

Id.

13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & Soc. JUST. 2 (2007)

greater weight than de-contextualized ethnographies from past generations.
Judge Sackville, however, declared that:
Expert anthropological evidence is unlikely to cure certain kinds of
gaps or deficiencies in evidence adduced from Aboriginal witnesses. If,
for example, indigenous witnesses consistently disclaim a suggestion
that their traditional laws and customs allow interests in country to be
acquired in a particular manner, evidence to the contrary by an
anthropologist is unlikely to carry a great deal of weight. This will be
so even if the anthropologist's evidence is not directly challenged in
cross-examination, since evidence from indigenous witnesses is
normally regarded as providing the most44reliable account of traditional
laws and customs of the relevant people.
Such a view of expert anthropological evidence fails to comprehend
the interpretive assistance of indigenous witness testimony. Though Judge
Sackville recognizes the difficulties inherent in having indigenous witnesses
on the stand in a courtroom, 145 he nonetheless marginalizes the utility of
anthropologists in their professional interpretive ability to convey a holistic
summary of indigenous accounts of traditional laws and customs in a setting
more comfortable for indigenous people." 46 For example, outside of the
courtroom, an anthropologist may simultaneously engage more than one
native title claimant in dialogue. This is vitally important, especially in
regard to evaluating descent and kinship for traditional content. Professor
Sutton notes the following in his recent study of native title:
Working out what kinship relation holds between oneself and a newly
encountered person may take some time, unless the relationship is
found to be fairly close. The solution to the calculation problem
usually focuses on a meaningful relationship each person holds to a
common third party... .One may trace such a connection in more than
one way, through more than one third party, and thus end up able to
define the mutual kin connection in more than one potentially
acceptable way.. .Disjunctions often occur, especially in cases where
unrelated or very distantly related people interact as kin. For example,
of two men who call each other brother, one may call a third party
'mother' while the other calls the same woman 'sister,' tracing (or
'tracking') their kin connections via distinct pathways to the same
Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. [2006] 152 F.C.R. 150, 1 291.
See Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. [2006] 152 F.C.R. 150, 1 294 (taking into account the fact
that cultural barriers exist in communication).
l4
See id. 291 (opining that expert anthropological evidence will not fix certain deficiencies in
evidence from Aboriginal witnesses).
144
145
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person. There is no particular pressure, in my 47
experience, to regularize
these triangular cases of apparent disharmony.1
The significance of anthropologists' interviewing native title
claimants, as a means of clarifying- nay, translating indigenous accounts of
traditional laws and customs for the sake of a Western judiciary, was
recognized in Griffiths. Judge Weinberg was careful to realize how formal
testimony in earlier land rights' claims could mislead a fact-finder about the
nature of the kinship system:
A number of the indigenous persons who gave evidence before
Commissioner Maurice referred to their countries by reference to male
ancestry only. They listed themselves, and members of their patriline,
first, when responding to questions about responsibilities for sites, and
their links with country. However, according to Dr Palmer and
Ms Asche it was significant that these same witnesses also recognised
matrilineal inheritance, and indeed, recognised that an 48interest in
country might be able to be gained by other means as well.'
Judges are not the only persons who may be misled to see a strict
patrilineal system of descent in tradition that has out of nowhere inserted a
cognatic one. The earliest ethnographic account used in Griffiths for
historical data, that of Professor Stanner, was impeached by both the
Northern Territory's and claimant's experts, for "Professor Stanner had been
wrong in relation to . . . his notion that patrilineal descent operated
universally throughout Australia."'149 In fact, the patripotestal tradition of
English mores themselves has been a most difficult plank in the eye of
Western anthropological theory. As the experts on behalf of the native title
claimants in Griffiths explained:
Dr Palmer and Ms Asche say that neither the anthropological evidence,
nor the scholarly literature upon the subject, provides a concluded or
agreed view on these questions. They say that until approximately
twenty or so years ago, there was undoubtedly an assumption among
anthropologists that country groups were patrilineally recruited.
However, evidence produced as a result of extensive research into land
claims has shown that this may not in fact have been the case. In
147 SUTTON, supra note 110, at 176.
148 Griffiths v. N. Territory of Austl. [2006] F.C.A. 903,
149 Id. 1 450.

346.
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addition, it is now clear that rights to country
5 can be gained in a number
of ways, patrilineal descent being but one. 7

Judge Weinberg in Griffiths, in contrast to Judge Sackville in Jango,
benefits from the presence of experts who have properly considered the
relevant evidence representing the opposing parties. Although some of
Professor Sansom's interpretations in Griffiths are contrary to the legal
rudiments of native title, 15' he and the claimants' experts, Dr. Palmer and
Ms. Asche, provided useful expertise for the sake of the native title claim at
stake. By analyzing evidence relevant to the proceedings at hand and
grounding their expert conclusions upon that evidence, Judge Weinberg was
able to settle Griffiths based upon comparably qualified expert testimony.
As every primary judge handling a native title claim should recognize, His
Honour has effectuated the appropriate standard for augmenting difficult
indigenous witness testimony with qualified expert interpretation seeking to
clarify what indigenous witnesses meant:
The real factual dispute in this case turns not upon the primary facts
adduced through the indigenous witnesses, but rather upon what
interpretation should be placed upon those facts. Each side relied
heavily upon anthropological evidence in support of its case. In the end,
I am required to decide, as between Dr Palmer and Ms Asche, and
Sansom, whose interpretation of those primary facts I
Professor
1
prefer. 52
That neither the Commonwealth nor the Northern Territory provided
an anthropological expert in Jango to counter Professor Sutton's report
improperly left the task of rebuttal to Judge Sackville. The absence of a
Commonwealth expert left the government relying heavily upon the
ethnographic data of Tindale without any relationship between that older
data and the indigenous witness testimony elucidated on the
Commonwealth's part. 153 Furthermore, it is highly misleading to rely upon
older ethnographic data alone, without modern interpretation, due to the

150 Id. 1350.
151 See, e.g., Griffiths, F.C.A. 903,

388 (dismissing any inference in favor of finding tradition

dating back to 1825, as no evidence exists that far back).
152 Id. 475.
153 See Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. [2006] 152 F.C.R. 150, 1 258 (criticizing Professor Sutton's
reworking of Tindale's field data).

NATIVE TITLE IN THE WAKE OF YORTA YORTA

significant changes that have occurred to the discipline
of anthropology,
54
rights.
of
descent
and
kinship
to
regard
in
especially
4. Summary of evidentiary reforms recommended
In sum, anthropologists who willingly and intentionally participate in
native title claims for either a government or a claimant need to ensure that
their expert testimony or report to the court remains empirically tied to both
the ethnographic and indigenous witness evidence. Conversely, trial judges
must come to realize the very different dialogue that indigenous witnesses
have with anthropologists. Rather than being asked to step into a very
foreign forum for the purpose of answering unilateral questions that draw an
arbitrary and misleading line of "precise" factual findings, native title
claimants are approached by anthropologists on the terms of the indigenous
culture for the sake of inquiry.
The anthropological inquiry that strives to be open-ended should in
fact improve the efficacy and justice of the native title claims process. The
tendency of a good number of anthropologists to abstract broad interpretive
conclusions about "traditional" society without providing relevant historical
evidence and indigenous witness evidence renders such opinions
unacceptably valueless to a common law judge. Even if "structural" analysis
is offensive to the anthropological expert, such simplified structural
presentations may provide a clear means to critique reductionist and rigid
views of what may be far more elastic normative systems reflecting
traditional laws and customs.
At the same time, historical evidence of traditional laws and customs
gleaned from older ethnographic texts is, without adequate modem
reinterpretation by an anthropological expert, a substandard means of making
any finding of fact in a court of law. Ideally, each side in a native title claim
should present at least one expert witness to assist the primary judge in
comprehending the difficult nuances of the traditional laws and customs at
issue. One would imagine that such systematic presentation and weighing of
evidence in native title cases would improve the legal recognition of
surviving indigenous traditions in Australia.

154

See Griffiths v. N. Territory of Austl. [2006] F.C.A. 903,

patrilineal descent has changed over time).

350 (concluding that the concept of
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IV.

PartIII. Conclusions of law and interpretationsof culture:finding
the "normative"principles of kinship

A. Incremental expansion of native title law: common law analogizing
Our comparison of the judicial treatment of indigenous kinship
systems in Jango and Griffiths has not yet yielded an answer to the singular
question: Is a transition from a patrilineal system of descent to a cognatic one
"adaptive," thereby qualifying as "traditional," or is such a move to be
considered the result of "parallel-law making," an impermissible innovation
to indigenous tradition that causes native title rights and interests to implode?
Our analysis must come to understand what tradition of indigenous law and
customs defines the normative system of the indigenous society before the
court.

When the High Court developed its "normative system" test in Yorta
Yorta, it was mindful of the following:
[R]eference to a normative "system" of traditional laws and customs
may itself be distracting if undue attention is given to the word
"system," particularly if it were to be understood as confined in its
application to systems of law that have 55all the characteristics of a
developed European body of written laws.1

With such admonishment, however, no conceptual guidance was
provided to help judges who were educated within the Western legal
tradition to understand the distinctive characteristics of indigenous
Australian normative systems. We herein suggest a conceptual distinction at
this intersection of normative systems; the following discussion in the rest of
Part I1 is intended to assist in bridging the gap between indigenous
Australian legal traditions and Western ones. If the High Court of Australia
can be consistent in its cautious approach to expanding any field of law, "the
law should develop novel categories ...

incrementally and by analogy...

rather than by a massive extension" of what constitutes traditional laws and
customs. 56 Rather than expect judges trained in the Western tradition to
adapt instantly to the complexities of indigenous Australian civilizations, we
suggest that ancient Roman legal concepts may offer an interpolated
perspective between indigenous Australian and British systems of law and
custom.
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422,
156 Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 157 C.L.R. 424, 481.
155

39.
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There are, in Roman terms, four types of law relevant to
understanding the difference between indigenous Australian and European
normative systems. 157 The primary term for use in the native title context is
"mos" (customary law). Mos arguably constitutes "traditional laws and
customs" entirely. 158 An important corollary to mos, however, is "ius"
(human law). Jus may represent either a person's individual rights or the
enforcement of a socially prevalent normative value. 159 Not only is ius
distinguished from fas (spiritual law),' 6° but it is also not coterminous with
lex (written law). 161 Ius need not refer to written law alone, though Western
societies have increasingly associated ius primarily with written code (e.g.,
Justinian Code is also known as corpus juris civilis).
The development of written law in the United Kingdom, by the time
that the British Empire came to declare sovereignty over the Australian
continent, had become so ingrained that the obvious absence of lex among
indigenous Australians led to the tragic inference that ius also did not exist
on the continent. Such reasoning by the British led to the adoption of the
doctrine of terra nullius in the settlement of Australia. Only
in 1992 did the
62
High Court refuse to maintain such a fiction any longer.
Alas, the High Court of Australia has only taken a partial step to cure
the ill effects of terra nullius. Whereas prior to Mabo 16 Australia utterly
failed to recognize any indigenous system of law relating to land, after Yorta
Yorta' 64 it is now clear that the common law conception of native title too
greatly analogizes its own format to the clearly distinct and foreign body of
traditional laws and customs. That the majority in Yorta Yorta would
articulate that "only those normative rules [of ancient origin] . . . are

'traditional'

laws and customs," 165 and that "[after] the assertion of

157 The author recognizes that Roman legal concepts themselves do not translate indigenous
Australian customs and laws neatly: we only use these terms to illustrate the distinction between Western
traditions and indigenous Australian ones, and why common law court must analyze the latter in a manner
distinct from its usual precepts.
158 LEwis AND SHORT'S LATIN DICTIONARY (1879).
159 Id.

16o Id. At least in the native title context, the Australian common law has recognized that spiritual
traditions are relevant. See, e.g., W. Austl. v. Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1, 64 (stating that spiritual
connection may be proof of connection with land but not enough to give rise to a claim of title);]; see also
De Rose v. S. Austl. [No 2] (2005) 145 F.C.R. 290, 91 104-106 (analyzing spiritual connections to land as
one type of proof to a claim of title to that land)].
161 LEWIS AND SHORT'S LATIN DICTIONARY (1879).
162 See Mabo v. Queensland H (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (declaring the doctrine of terra nullius

irrelevant to the British claim of native lands).
163 Mabo v. Queensland 1 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
"
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422.
165 id. at 444, 46.
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sovereignty by the British Crown . . .there could ...be no parallel lawmaking system,"' 66 could easily cause a trial judge to misidentify traditional
laws and customs as comparable to the general characteristics of European
written laws. In other words, in the absence of indigenous lex, the common
law's recognition of native title must come to examine and comprehend the
exclusive interplay of ius, fas, and mos within indigenous Australian
societies. In recognizing the traditional laws and customs of indigenous
Australian societies, the courts must give real effect to the settled principle
that "[n]ative title is not a creature of the common law"' 67 and that native title
emerged in Australia prior to the arrival of British sovereignty demands
unique treatment within the common law, in accordance with the nature and
content of anterior traditional laws and customs.
B. Anthropologicalcritique and apologies:the Western academy at the
intersection of methodology and empathy
168
Our treatment of the facts in both Jango and Griffiths
demonstrates that anthropological experts not only may be uniquely qualified
for interpreting native title evidence, but are even necessary to assist the
court in understanding, for example, that "patrilineal" preference in
aboriginal Australian cultures is not the same as the rigid patrilineal rules of
descent practiced in England until the 2 0 th century.169 Thus Professor Sutton
is careful to identify "classical" aboriginal Australian systems of kinship to
be most commonly "patrifilial," if not "patrilineal." 170 In Griffiths, Dr. Palmer
and Ms. Asche successfully convey to Judge Weinberg the following:

[D]escent at Timber Creek is reckoned as cognatic, although there
would appear to be some preference for claiming country via
patrifiliation . . . . Given the complex and rich nature of the social
relationships that underpin the commensality of the country groups
discussed here, it appears unlikely to us that this represents an
innovation... [by] a society that was characterised by autonomous and
hermetic patrilineal groups. 171
166 Id. at 443-44, 44.
167 Id. at 453, 75.

168 Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) 152 F.C.R. 150; Griffiths v. N. Territory of Austl. [No 2]
(2006) F.C.A. 903.
169 See Administration of Estates Act, 1925 (abolishing the Anglo-Saxon vestige of primogeniture
from English Land Law).
170 SUTrON,supra note 110, at 214.
171 See Griffiths v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) F.C.A. 903,

377 (quoting expert report). See

also SUrroN, supra note 110, at 218 ("In practice people may retain a patrilineal ideological bias while de
facto acknowledging non-patrilineal group membership.").
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The normative system that preceded the arrival of British
sovereignty should not be evaluated on the minutiae of rules which are not
even "patrilineal" in the British moral sense; rather, "the crucial point is
[whether] rights to 'country' . . . are and always have been based upon
The fundamental principle of Aboriginal
principles of descent."'' 72
Australian normative systems is "classificatory kinship itself, one of the
hallmarks of classical Aboriginal culture, [which] rests on the capacity to
recognise everyone in society as belonging to a finite number of kin
categories, or kinds of people."' 73 Furthermore, the "classical principle of
mutual trust and amity independent of
consociation leading to a degree of
174
genealogical closeness continues."
On behalf of the native title claimants in Jango, Professor Sutton
elucidated just how the simplistic and rudimentary interpretations of earlier
ethnography were "'coloured by some bias towards the search for order and
structure and tended, for example, to give too much emphasis to the
ideological statements of older men in contrast with the attention given to the
messier realities of the case material. ' " 75 In the absence of an opposing
expert who could have fortified or explained the earlier ethnographic
accounts upon which His Honour relies despite countervailing indigenous
witness testimony, Judge Sackville failed to recognize the complexity
imbued in Aboriginal Australian kinship systems, reducing the Western
Desert to a hermetic patrilineal system of descent in his findings of fact. On
account of the claimants' pleading that a broader system of descent had
always been in traditional practices of the Western Desert, Judge Sackville
refused to evaluate whether a transition from the patrilineal system of his
own perception to the cognatic one in the claimants' pleading is an
adaptation within the meaning of Yorta Yorta, or an innovation that
extinguishes the force of traditional law and customs.176 Judge Sackville
clearly insinuates that, had they177asked him to address that question, he would
not have received it favorably.
His Honour, in his own words, summarizes his finding regarding descent as follows: "In short... I
find that there has been a gradual shift from a patrilineal to a cognatic system, and that this shift continues
today ....The shift to cognation is one of emphasis and degree." Griffiths, F.C.A. 903 at 501.
172 Griffiths, F.C.A. 903 at 1501.
173 SuTrON, supra note 110, at 215.
174 Id.
175 Jango v. N. Territory of Austl. [2006] 152 F.C.R. 150, 1 477.
Id.7 501.
177 See id. 501 ("Specifically, the applicants do not contend that if the content of the traditional
176

laws and customs was as I have described, those laws and customs contemplated the virtual abandonment
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Even if we accept Judge Sackville's finding that patrilineal descent
was the version of kinship practiced in the Western Desert at the moment of
sovereignty,178 as a matter of law, the changes he found to have occurred in
the indigenous system of descent should have nevertheless been evaluated
under Yorta Yorta's test for a traditional connection. It would be a severe
injustice if analysis of the system of descent examined indigenous Australian
rules of descent as if they were statutory amendments to Acts of Parliament.
The notion of a "parallel law-making" system announced in Yorta Yorta has
thus been misleading in Jango.
The common law of Australia cannot uncritically apply inapt
analogues from the cultural, moral, and legal foundations of the British
Empire to the law of native title. When normative rules of kinship are
judicially scrutinized for evidence of a substantially maintained tradition
within indigenous laws and customs, the factfinder must calibrate their
analysis to determine specifically whether "the anthropological data, and the
ethnography, indicate an enduring continuity of belief and practice which
developed from
a fundamental cultural system that underpinned the society
79
1
question."
in
V. Concluding remarks
Mabo remains a landmark effort to seek meaningful compromise
between the Australian sovereigns and the indigenous systems of laws and
customs which are so utterly unfamiliar to the common law. The High Court
decision in Yorta Yorta appears to have been an attempt to formulate more
rigorous requirements of native title claimants than Justice Brennan had
articulated in regards to the maintenance of tradition: whereas Brennan had
declared broadly that "[iut is immaterial that the laws and customs have
undergone some changes since the Crown acquired sovereignty provided the
general nature of the connection between the indigenous people and the land
remains." 80 Through Yorta Yorta the High Court has elaborated that this
"general nature" be evident in a normative system of traditional laws and
customs, whose content has been so substantially maintained that the
connection to land constitutes native title rights and interests.' 8' The High
of patrilineal descent and the acceptance of an ill-defined and far-reaching 'kin links' principle identifying
ngurraritjafor country.").
178 Id. [505.
179 Griffiths v. N. Territory of Austl. (2006) F.C.A. 903,

291.
180 Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 70 (emphasis added).
181 As opposed to mere "observable patterns of behaviour." Members of the Yorta Yorta

Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422, 1 42.

NATIVE TITLE IN THE WAKE OF YORTA YORTA

Court's decision in Yorta Yorta, however, has exposed as much anxiety as it
has resolved, and its meaning must be further elucidated in light of lower
court decisions relying upon its precedent.
Although this paper does emphatically critique the open-ended
nature of the holding in Yorta Yorta, the hasty manner in which the British
Empire inaccurately codified traditional indigenous laws and customs
relating to land in Fiji admonishes present day post-colonial governments
that anthropological accuracy in native title will increase the measure of
justice. 182 The common law properly requires more time to integrate ancient
systems of land tenure into its own stubborn principles of property. Even
though the growing pains of native title law continue to confound so many
persons on each side of the imperial frontier, in truth the Commonwealth of
Australia shall ultimately serve justice better if its High Court takes the time
to consider the reasoning of such decisions as Griffiths and to review such
defective holdings as Jango.
As convenient as it would be for native title law to have been
resolutely delineated in 1992-nay, even in 2002-in truth, NTA § 223(1),
whether interpreted by Noel Pearson or the majority in Yorta Yorta, has been
wisely constructed with deference not only to the High Court decision in
Mabo, but also to the common law in posterity. The federal courts are the
most qualified representative of Australian sovereignty to investigate what
truly constitutes "native title," "native title rights and interests," and
"traditional laws and customs." The common law of Australia must,
however, make a much stronger effort to obtain an intersubjective and more
accurate understanding of indigenous cultural norms and practices. It must
not only seek to recognize native title rights and interests, but it must also
reconcile the stubbornness of our ancient Norman presumptions underlying
the common law of property with the distinct and unique features which set
apart indigenous "traditional laws and customs." Native Title in Australia
has yet to reach a point in its development when history can draw any
conclusions about the extent to which the courts and legislatures have
succeeded in providing indigenous Australians with access to substantial
justice. Whithersoever is steered the law of native title in the wake of Yorta
Yorta, it remains to be seen if the hope borne out of Mabo shall emerge out
of its current desperation or revert to the numbing emptiness of terra nullius.
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See John Clammer, Colonialismand the Perception of Tradition in Fiji, in ANTHROPOLOGY

AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER (Talal Asad ed.) (critiquing the Imperialist project to codify indigenous
land law using British conceptualizations).

